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Abstract 
This article analyses the role of the European Council in two key 
legislative packages on economic and budgetary coordination, the Six-
Pack and the Two-Pack, which were negotiated under the ordinary 
legislative procedure. It assesses how and to what extent the key actor in 
the literature on the new intergovernmentalism – the European Council – 
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is able to curb the powers of the supranational institutions – the 
Commission and the European Parliament – in a policy area where the 
community method has been applied since the Treaty of Lisbon. It tracks 
the development of the legislative negotiations – from the stages 
preceding the Commission’s proposal to their conclusions, relying on 
official documents, press reports and 30 original interviews with key 
decision-makers. The strong role of the European Council both as an 
agenda-setter and in the legislative negotiations stands out, and suggests 
that the implications of new intergovernmentalism may well extend 
beyond intergovernmental decision-making processes. 
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Introduction 
“As a result of this trend towards ‘summitization’, the fixation with 
meetings at which the heads of state and government, in a clear breach 
of the spirit of the Treaties, take more and more decisions themselves 
and seek to put their stamp even on the fine print of legislation, the 
Community institutions are increasingly being marginalized”. This is how 
the President of the European Parliament (EP), Martin Schulz, portrayed 
decision-making in the European Union (EU).i The academic literature has 
captured a similar development and, especially but not exclusively, in the 
field of economic and financial policies, has described the European 
Council as “the political executive of the Union” (Fabbrini 2013, 1006). In 
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the “new” formulation of “intergovernmentalism”, the European Council 
is the “centre of political gravity” of the EU (Puetter 2014, Ch. 3). 
As the financial and economic crisis broke out in 2009, the issue of 
reforming the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) featured 
prominently in the EU agenda. In a context dominated by the Heads of 
State and government (hereafter, ‘the Heads’), the ‘intergovernmental’ 
method became the dominant mode of decision-making, while the 
‘community’ method – where the Commission sets the agenda and the EP 
is on a par with the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) 
– was marginalized. In the post-Maastricht era (Bickerton et al. 2015a) 
and, specifically, in the context of the Eurocrisis (Fabbrini 2013; 2015), the 
Heads have further institutionalized their coordination in Brussels. They 
have pooled their powers in the policy areas that are crucially linked to 
state sovereignty, rather than sharing sovereignty with supranational 
institutions. In doing so, they no longer limit their role to the definition of 
the broad political strategy for the Union, but they also engage directly 
with crucial legislative choices. 
This article draws on the literature on the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ 
and, presenting an in-depth analysis of the reform of the EU economic 
governance, aims to make two main contributions. First, the new 
intergovernmentalism is generally presented as a decision-making mode 
alternative to the community method (Bickerton et al. 2015a). Yet, in one 
of the intergovernmental policy areas par excellence – macro-economic 
and budgetary coordination – the Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the role of 
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the EP to that of co-legislator (art. 121.6 TFEU), thus formally 
strengthening the community method. At present, however, the 
literature has only speculated on the impact of new 
intergovernmentalism on the community method and its institutions (i.e., 
Puetter 2014, 228-35). In this study, we argue that the European Council 
has a strong grip over the decision-making process, even when the OLP 
applies, at least, in budgetary policies. 
Second, we speculate on the mechanisms through which the European 
Council is able to give direction and influence the development of the 
legislative negotiations between the Council and the EP. We take issue 
with one of the main controversies dividing new intergovernmentalism 
and its critics: namely, that the propositions advanced by the new 
intergovernmentalists are too general to be empirically tested (Bickerton 
et al. 2015b; Schimmelfenning, 2015). We specify the mechanisms 
through which the European Council influences the legislative process, 
from the stage of agenda-setting through to the unfolding of the 
negotiations. Our argument is that the European Council has both the 
institutional resources and political legitimacy to frame the policy agenda 
and constantly remind the co-legislators and the European Commission 
what its preferences and priorities are. 
Our arguments are assessed on the cases of the Six-Pack and the Two-
Pack, the two key legislative packages that reshaped, under OLP, the EU’s 
economic governance as the economic and financial crisis hit the Union. 
We track the development of the legislative negotiations from the period 
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preceding the legislative proposal of the European Commission to the 
conclusion of the negotiations, keeping our analytical focus on the role of 
the European Council. The analysis is based on official documents of the 
institutions, articles in the specialized press and statements of politicians. 
Crucially, we complement the documentary evidence with 30 original 
interviews with key players from all of the EU institutions involved either 
in the design of the proposals or in the negotiations leading to their 
adoption. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the 
new intergovernmentalism and its implications for the EU political 
system. Section three presents the mechanisms through which the 
European Council is expected to influence the legislative process. Section 
four develops an analytical narrative on the unfolding of the negotiations 
of the Six-pack and the Two-pack. The concluding section discusses the 
main findings and their validity beyond the cases that are analysed here. 
 
The Rise of New Intergovernmentalism 
When the financial crisis spread to Europe and markets started to 
demand increasingly higher interest rates from several European 
countries with high debts and/or deficits, the EU reacted in two main 
ways. First, it quickly established assistance mechanisms to help countries 
experiencing severe financing problems and created new rules to make 
the coordination of national economic/fiscal policies stricter. In this 
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process of (re)defining the EU’s system of economic governance, the key 
actors were the intergovernmental institutions of the EU: the European 
Council, the Euro-summits, the ECOFIN Council and the Euro-group. As 
Fabbrini (2013, 1004) argues, the “extremely complex system of 
economic governance set up during the euro crisis” has been 
fundamentally “decided through and within the intergovernmental 
institutional framework”. 
Yet, these intergovernmental developments are seen as parts of larger 
trends in European integration. More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty is 
said to have formalized two different decision-making systems. On the 
one hand, the single market continues to be governed by the community 
method. On the other hand, as new policy areas (i.e., foreign policy, 
migration, financial cooperation) were added to the remit of the EU, they 
were largely directed by the intergovernmental institutions (Bickerton et 
al. 2015a). The “integration paradox” (Puetter 2014) consists in the 
recognition that integration is needed in key areas of state activity, but 
supranational institutions are granted a secondary, if not marginal, role. 
The Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized this dual decision-making logic for 
different policy regimes (Fabbrini 2015). As Schimmelfenning notes (2015, 
6), the policies that best suit the integration dynamics that are described 
by the new intergovernmentalism are in “core state powers” (Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs 2013) - that is, areas where integration entails high 
sovereignty and identity costs for the member states. This is the case of 
economic and budgetary cooperation, of which the European Council 
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quickly established itself as the ‘gouvernement economique’ (Fabbrini 
2013). 
Nevertheless, the analytical distinction between the intergovernmental 
method (applied to ‘new’ policy areas) and the community method (used 
in ‘traditional’ domains) should not conceal that complex interactions 
between the two methods may exist in the different policy fields. Indeed, 
in the post-Maastricht period, which the new intergovernmentalists 
characterizes as a “new phase in European integration” (Bickerton et al. 
2015a, 705), the successive waves of treaty revision have strengthened 
the legislative role of the EP in areas where it was previously only 
consulted. Most crucially here, the reform of the EU economic 
governance was also achieved through two legislative packages – the Six-
Pack and the Two-Pack – which were negotiated through the OLP. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EP was given the possibility to contribute to 
shaping the rules of the game, adopting “detailed rules for the 
multilateral surveillance procedure” (art. 121(6); see Rittberger 2014) 
under the OLP. 
Arguably, these latter cases provide the most stringent test for the new 
intergovernmentalism. To what extent are the supranational institutions 
able to use their powers within an otherwise intergovernmental policy 
regime? On the other hand, how is the European Council eventually able 
to curb the formal decision-making powers of the European Commission 
and the EP? The Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are generally presented as 
(partial) exceptions to the story of new intergovernmentalism, as they 
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“strengthened the supranational side of the EU” (Fabbrini 2013, 1016). 
However, “the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure in 
successive treaty revisions does not eo ipso signal more 
supranationalism” (Bickerton et al. 2015b, 733). Expounding on this 
insight, we argue that the supranational institutions failed to act 
according to the roles traditionally identified by the community method. 
We hypothesize that both institutions are significantly constrained by the 
activism of the European Council. The latter has both the institutional 
resources and political legitimacy to frame the policy agenda, thus 
entering into a domain that the treaties (art. 17 TEU) reserved to the 
European Commission. It also has the leverage to instruct or influence the 
actors that are directly involved in the negotiations, thus informally 
exceeding the letter of the Treaty of Lisbon: “the European Council shall 
not exercise legislative functions” (art. 15(1) TEU). 
 
The Long Shadow of the European Council on the Legislative Process 
 
 Agenda-setting  
From the establishment of the EC, the Heads (meeting in the European 
Council since the early 1970s) have set the general direction to the 
process of integration, taking landmark decisions on its future from treaty 
reform to enlargement (i.e., Bulmer and Wessels 1987). Yet, with the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the boost of the economic and financial crisis, 
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the direction given by the Heads became both more detailed in terms of 
policy content and more specific in defining time deadlines on legislation. 
The analysis of the Heads’ meetings in the post-Maastricht period (1992-
2013) shows that two-thirds of their agendas related to new areas of EU 
activity, mainly economic governance and foreign affairs. The frequency 
of their meetings increased: from three per year in the early 1990s, to 
seven or more since 2008, and reaching a peak of 11 in the apex of the 
crisis. The ‘Conclusions’ of the European Council became increasingly 
detailed, providing clear instructions to the other institutional actors 
involved in the legislative process (Puetter 2014, Ch. 3). While the 
legislative proposals of the Commission – which retains the formal right 
of initiative – are never taken in a vacuum, often being the product of 
intense dialogue with other institutions or actors (Princen 2007), the level 
of detail of the European Council’s Conclusions, combined with the 
authority and legitimacy of its members, make it “difficult to do 
something else” (Puetter 2014, 73). The Commission has ample 
administrative resources to concretely prepare policy dossiers and give 
substance to political ideas. However, they would be pursued because a 
political decision had been previously made by the intergovernmental 
institutions and, particularly, the European Council. The Commission 
becomes a facilitator, a transmission belt or even an armed branch of the 
European Council’s policy preferences, acting ‘on behalf’ of the Heads or 
as their agent in a principal-agent framework (Bauer and Becker 2014; 
Curtin 2012, 208-13). 
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Therefore, while, de jure, the division of labour between the European 
Council and the Commission is relatively straightforward – the former 
defining the general strategy for the EU’s action, the latter presenting the 
legislative proposals – this is not always the case in practice. Acting, in 
particular, in response to an international crisis or to an event of high 
public salience, the European Council is likely to directly call for EU action 
and mandate the European Commission with detailed ‘instructions’ (see 
Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014). The mandate may emerge from a common 
deliberation of the European Council, acting in collaboration to boost the 
legitimacy of its actions (Puetter 2012), or from the leading role of a 
directorate of member states, such as the Franco-German tandem, or 
Germany and its Northern allies (Fabbrini 2013; 2015). In any case, 
whatever the trigger, when the Heads set the agenda and establish the 
normative framework, the Commission can be expected to not only act 
strategically and “avoid putting forward proposals that stand little chance 
of success” (Bickerton et al. 2015a, 713) but also to follow suit the 
impulse and recommendations of the European Council.  
Decision-making Process 
The European Council can also intervene during the policy-making 
process itself. On the one hand, the policy content of an issue – 
introduced in the policy process and framed by the Heads – can be 
considerably changed by the EU's co-legislators. On the other hand, the 
policy process can be considerably slowed down by the same institutions 
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(especially the EP), interfering with the objectives of the European 
Council. As a result, the Heads have vested interests in closely following 
the dossier during the policy-making process to make sure that both the 
content and the timing of the policy file are respected. 
The Heads can change the structure of the negotiating game by 
threatening to adopt new rules or move to other decision-making settings 
– e.g., by going intergovernmental. During the Euro crisis, the European 
Council has certainly not shied away from using intergovernmental 
methods and new treaties based on international law (Schwarzer 2012). 
Indeed, the European Council is perfectly located within the institutional 
architecture to determine and/or modify the BATNAs (Best Alternative to 
a Negotiated Agreement) of the negotiating parties. A good BATNA 
increases the negotiating power, whereas limited or non-existent 
alternatives might lead one side to accept even unattractive demands. In 
the context of the OLP, the European Council can indicate its intention to 
end the talks and seek an intergovernmental treaty outside of the EU 
legal system, where the EP and the Commission would not have any say. 
This changes the situation, shifting the policy outcomes closer to the 
preferences of the European Council.  
A different reading suggests that the rise of the European Council has a 
profound impact on how EU institutions (especially the two supranational 
ones) perceive their legislative responsibilities. The Heads are political 
actors who are highly visible and legitimated at the domestic level. The 
EU supranational actors might accept the greater activism of the 
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European Council and – in cases where this latter institution wants to 
take the lead – acknowledge its driving role, align with it and be (fairly) 
cooperative. Under its strong political leadership, the EP and the 
Commission in particular, would come to redefine their role in terms of 
responsibility and (self-) restraint – a de facto subordination to the 
strategies of the European Council (Ripoll Servent 2013; Werts 2008, 45-
7). 
The degree and forms of the European Council's involvement in the 
concrete EU legislative process might vary. It might be satisfied to act as a 
relatively distant supervisor, simply making sure that its objectives are 
met overall. On the other hand, the Heads may continuously interfere in 
the policy process by exerting constant pressure on the co-legislators and 
the Commission. Depending on the level of European Council's 
interference, we may have different understandings of how the new 
intergovernmentalism works. 
a) European Council and Commission. We would expect the Commission 
to follow the desiderata of the European Council and side with the 
Council. Significantly, this would also apply when the eventual policy 
arrangements that are put forward by the EP go into the direction of the 
original Commission's proposal or aim at strengthening the Commission's 
powers. Thus, the traditional understanding of the Commission as a 
natural ally of the EP (Kreppel 1999) or as a supranational policy 
entrepreneur that is primarily interested with increasing its own powers, 
should be revisited. In this way, the hypothesis on the new 
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intergovernmentalism proposed by Bickerton et al. (2015a, 712) – 
“Supranational institutions are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union” 
– finds an application to this stage of the EU's decision-making process. At 
the same time, the Commission's role as a mediator could be challenged 
by other more intergovernmental institutions such as the rotating 
Presidency or the President of the European Council. 
b) European Council and Council. We would expect the European Council 
to act in many ways as the ‘principal’ of the Council: “the process changes 
from bottom-up—with the Council formations coming up with proposals 
to the European Council—to top-down” (cited in Puetter 2014, 149). The 
degree of the European Council’s intervention over the affairs of the 
Council can vary. The European Council might leave ample autonomy to 
the Council, once the direction of the legislative process has been set. On 
the other hand, the activity of the Council can be highly constrained. We 
would expect that the Heads closely instruct and shape the inner 
workings of the Council and substitute it in exerting pressure on the 
Commission and the EP. In-between these two situations, a variety of 
possibilities exist, including (implicit or explicit) forms of coordinated 
cooperation between the Council and the European Council. 
c) European Council and Parliament. We would expect the European 
Council to put pressure on the Parliament in order to bring legislation 
closer to its preferences. One of the objectives of the European Council 
would be to operate in order to decrease the cohesion in the Parliament. 
Internal division in the Parliament has been shown to reduce its 
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bargaining success (Costello and Thomson 2013). As a result, national 
governments have all of the incentives to lobby members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) – especially those who belong to their same 
national parties (Costello and Thomson 2014). In order to influence the 
workings of the EP, strategies include setting up (or hinting at) benefits 
for current MEPs for their career at the national level; threatening to go 
intergovernmental; or politically and normatively urging them to act 
responsibly and show institutional maturity (see above). 
 
Legislating on Economic Governance 
In order to assess these arguments, this paper tracks the unfolding of the 
legislative negotiations for the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack from the period 
preceding the adoption of the proposal by the Commission to its 
conclusion with the agreement of the co-legislators, keeping its analytical 
focus on the strategy and behaviour of the European Council. By 
reconstructing the different phases of the negotiations and the positions 
of the different actors on the main issues, we are able to uncover the 
mechanisms at play and evaluate the implications of new 
intergovernmentalism in a ‘most difficult’ case, when the OLP applies. The 
narrative is based on official documents of the institutions, declarations 
of key actors and excerpts from the specialized EU-press. 
Crucially, this documentation is backed by 30 original interviews with ‘key 
informants’ involved in the negotiations of the two packages. The 
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interviewees were selected from each institution – the Council, the 
Commission and the EP – in order to compare and contrast different 
narratives. Our sample includes both administrators and political advisors 
and members of the major political groups in the EP, administrators in the 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs of the Commission, in the Directorate 
on Economic and Financial Affairs or the Legal Services of the Council, and 
several financial advisors in the Permanent Representations (including 
two Presidencies). The semi-structured interviews were designed in an 
open-format and, given the sensitive information, were anonymized (see 
the Appendix). 
The Six-Pack 
On 13th December 2011, five Regulations and one Directive – together 
known as Six-pack – entered into force. Four of the six texts in the 
package dealt with fiscal issues, including a reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), while two new regulations developed a system to 
respectively detect, address and eventually sanction macroeconomic 
imbalances in the EU.ii 
In the wake of the crisis, the EU leaders agreed to reform and strengthen 
the EU economic governance structure. In February 2010, in a restricted 
meeting at the Bibliothèque Solvay in Brussels, the President of the 
European Council laid out a one page-outline with a framework for 
economic reforms for the coming years (Interview M). The decisions to be 
made were all strictly interrelated: plans to save Greece were connected 
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to the establishment of temporary/permanent financial stability 
mechanisms and the hardening of the fiscal rules to be applied to the 
member states (Interview A). One aspect concerned the strengthening of 
the SGP, the reduction of debt levels and the achievement of balanced 
budgets in the member states. In relation to this, the European Council 
urged the Commission to come out with policy proposals (Interview F) 
and established, under the chairmanship of its President Herman Van 
Rompuy, a Task Force with representatives of the then 27 member states, 
the Commission, the rotating presidency and the ECB, with the aim of 
presenting, before the end of the year, the measures needed to reach an 
“improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary discipline” 
(European Council Conclusions, March 2010).  
At this point, “the race started” between the Commission and the Task 
Force to produce reform plans: “there was an element of institutional 
competition. It was very clear that President Barroso wanted to show the 
[Commission's] right of initiative” (Interview M). The Commission 
explicitly accelerated its internal policy-process and presented its six 
legislative proposals on 29th September 2010, a few weeks before the 
Task Force delivered its final report. The two texts are highly similar. 
There has been wide speculation about the “unfriendly rivalry” (Interview 
H) between these two actors, both keen to strengthen their institutional 
power via agenda control (see also Laffan and Schlosser 2015, 2-3). On 
the one hand, some officials report that “people are aware that it was 
Van Rompuy that was first. It was not a cut and paste but [the 
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Commission] took a lot of elements” of the Task Force report (Interview L; 
also Interviews H and S). On the other hand, officials in the Commission 
replied that, due to its large and highly specialized administration, most 
of the ideas were originated in the Commission. In this perspective, the 
Task Force was not much more than an effective sounding board for the 
plans that the Commission had conceived (Interview G). 
A few points can be clarified at this stage. First, if the Six-pack emerged 
out of the many discussions, documents and non-papers that the 
Commission had been producing in the previous years (Interviews A, F 
and L), these ideas became real pieces of legislation only because their 
overriding principles had been endorsed (even requested) by the highest 
political authorities at the beginning of 2010. The decisive factor was the 
political will of the Heads (Interviews G, H, L, S and W). Without their 
pressure, the Six-Pack “wouldn’t have happened of course” (Interview I). 
Second, even accepting the Commission's interpretation of the Task 
Force, the explicit and formal institutionalization of an intergovernmental 
body, which would give feedback on what states considered important or 
difficult to realize (Interview G and I), is highly revealing of the EU’s new 
modes of governance (and of the OLP), as well as of the member states' 
attempts to have a firm grip on the policy process. Third, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) also played an important role in the genesis of the Six-
pack. Their guidelines and opinions were technically very precise and 
influential (Interview E, I and S; also O’Keeffe et al. 2015). 
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After the Commission submitted the proposals, the Six-pack was 
examined by the Council and the EP. The decision-making process was 
smooth in the Council. The disagreements were relatively few and minor: 
the ministers reached a common position in mid-March 2011, which did 
not deviate much from the Commission's proposals. The relatively 
uncontroversial and speedy process within the Council was due to several 
factors. First, the Euro crisis was both deepening and widening. The 
European Council, through specific indications contained in its 
Conclusions, exerted strong pressure on the legislators for a quick end of 
the policy process. In December 2010, it called for an acceleration of the 
work, so that the legislative proposals could be adopted by June 2011. In 
February 2011, it urged that, in March, the Council should reach a first 
agreement on the approach to the Six-Pack – which was then welcomed 
in the Conclusions of the 25th March, where the objective of reaching a 
final agreement by June was reiterated. 
Second, the Commission proposals closely resembled the plans envisaged 
by the Task Force. For the Council officials, the report of the Task Force 
had become “the Bible” (Interview A). It was logical then that the Council 
would largely accept the Commission’s original blueprint. Finally, the 
political agreement within the Council was cemented by the deal that was 
struck in Deauville (18th October 2010) between Angela Merkel and 
Nicolas Sarkozy. Here, the French resistance, with the hardening of fiscal 
rules and more automatic sanctions, was overcome by the establishment 
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of a permanent rescue mechanism for financially stricken states 
(Interviews A and S). 
In the EP, when the ECON Committee adopted the six reports on 19th 
April 2011, there was a clear left-right divide on the reform of the SGP, 
especially on the surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (the ‘Wortmann-Kool report’). Despite 
the standard norms of consensus in the EP, only a small majority (EPP and 
ALDE) approved the report, with the opposition of the S&D and the 
Greens (see O'Keeffe et al. 2015).  
Negotiations began at a very high pace (Interviews T and Y). In trilogues, 
the Commission was said to go beyond a more neutral role as a broker 
and, ultimately, side with the Council. Some MEPs complained that the 
Commission rejected amendments “that were largely supported by the 
EP without any clear mandate” (Interview C; Interviews N and T). Pressure 
to come to a quick agreement came from all sides, especially the Heads. 
For instance, Merkel and Sarkozy increased their pressure on the 
members of the EPP so that this group was ready to have the deal 
reached before summer (Interview P). Consensus was achieved on almost 
every point. As Rehn, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
said to the EP and the Council in June: “You have agreed on 99.9% of the 
substance. I now ask both sides to go the last few centimetres to reach an 
agreement”.iii 
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However, despite the high similarity of the two legislators' positions, a 
few issues remained open and the EP rejected the final offer of the 
Council. Most significantly, the two institutions failed to find a common 
position on the scope of reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV).iv 
RQMV produces a transfer of power from the Council to the Commission 
because the former needs a qualified majority to block a decision by the 
latter (Bauer and Becker 2014, 220). The ALDE group, in particular, 
insisted on having RQMV in one more case in the preventive arm of the 
SGP,v and threatened to vote against the whole package, if unsuccessful 
(Interview P). On the other, the Council (and especially France) did not 
want to shift the decision-making balance towards the Commission any 
further. 
Interestingly, the Commission, despite getting more powers from an 
extension of RQMV, did not support the EP position. Instead, it 
unequivocally sided with the Council (Interview P). In the words of Rehn, 
it was “absolutely crucial for the credibility of the European Union to 
conclude the package before the summer”.vi Under the pressure of the 
European Council, the Commission exhorted the EP to be responsible, 
insisting that ALDE would give up on RQMV (Interview AC). In the plenary 
in June, while rejecting the Council position, the EP only voted on the 
amendments, postponing the vote on the final legislative resolution and 
leaving open the possibility to conclude at first reading. With the utmost 
priority, the trilogues resumed and a compromise on RQMV was finally 
reached in mid-September. It was decided that, if a member state persists 
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in non-complying with the EU institutions’ recommendations, the 
Commission’s proposal would be adopted, unless a simple (rather than a 
qualified) majority of member states rejects it.vii  
The vote in the EP was contested. In particular, the two files that 
reformed the SGP were approved with a tight majority consisting of the 
EPP and ALDE. Among other aspects, they stressed the need to “be 
responsible”. As an interviewee put it, “you don’t want to go into a 
second reading if the European Council is telling you that you need to 
finish the reading and every time you read the newspaper [the Heads] are 
telling you, ‘move on, do something’” (Interview I). 
The final output of the negotiations does not depart too much from the 
Commission proposals and Council position. Political groups in the EP 
were unable or unwilling to shape the substance of the package. The Six-
pack introduces a series of measures aimed to produce more specific 
fiscal rules and to better enforce them. Initiatives designed to promote 
growth and employment, as well as the issuance of Eurobonds, were 
absent. A concrete achievement for the EP was the establishment of an 
‘Economic Dialogue’ with the EU and national institutions. Nevertheless, 
the Economic Dialogue was essentially a symbolic arrangement and did 
not change the substance of the Six-pack in any meaningful way 
(Interviews A, H, I and U).  
The Two-Pack 
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The Two-pack consisted of two regulations: the first strengthened 
budgetary surveillance and ensured the correction of excessive deficit of 
the member states in the Euro area (the ‘Ferreira report’). The second 
only concerned those member states in the Euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious financial difficulties (the ‘Gauzès report’). The 
two regulations aimed at complementing the Six-Pack and bringing 
elements of the intergovernmental Fiscal Compact under EU law.  
The European Commission initiated legislation on 23rd November 2011 
and the incoming Danish Presidency of the Council listed it among its top 
priorities. In the Conclusions of its meeting in December, the European 
Council made it very clear that it was urgent to conclude the negotiations: 
“We call on the Council and the EP to rapidly examine these regulations 
so that they will be in force by the next budgetary cycle”.viii As for the 
case of the Six-Pack, there was a sense of urgency accompanying the start 
of the negotiations in late 2011 / early 2012, when the economic crisis 
was hitting the Southern members of the Eurozone hard. 
The political weight of the European Council was needed to take 
authoritative decisions to effectively calm down the markets. While the 
Commission was putting forward its legislative proposals on the Two-
Pack, the Heads were concluding the negotiations on the Fiscal Compact. 
In such a scenario, the Commission refused to be marginalized and 
reacted by producing the legislative proposals “at record speed” 
(Interview F). Ultimately, the Commission’s effort was directed to make 
the wording of the Fiscal Compact compatible with the SGP and bring it 
23 
 
under the community method (Interviews F and H). The goal of the 
Commission was not to be sidelined in the new economic governance 
structure that was emerging, as driven by the crisis. To put it more 
forcefully, the Commission did not want to be “taken hostage or taken 
over by the intergovernmental track” (Interview G). Finally, the member 
states – and Germany, in particular – did not object to the empowerment 
of the Commission to have stricter rules of budgetary control in place 
(Interviews F and N). Other institutions were also closely involved in the 
redesign of economic governance: first of all, the ECB, whose 
endorsement was a strong push for the Fiscal Compact (Interviews S and 
Y). 
In the ECOFIN Council, the Commission legislative proposals were not 
particularly controversial. This was partly because the legislative text 
reflected that of the Fiscal Compact (Interviews G, N and Z) and partly 
because of the very active stance of the Danish Presidency, acting under a 
European Council mandate, that an agreement should be reached by June 
(Interview Z). 
By the end of February, the dossier had moved to the EP, where strong 
ideological divergences between its political groups emerged. The main 
dividing line was between the EPP supporting pro-austerity measures and 
the S&D favouring policies for growth and the mutualization of debt. 
There were essentially four key controversies between the political 
groups: on the provision for a redemption fund to part-mutualize public 
debt; on a road-map for EU-level bonds; on the creation of a growth 
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facility measure and on a more extensive remit of the regulation including 
macroeconomic coordination. Nonetheless, the reports, as amended by 
the Committee, were approved, despite the opposition and abstention in 
the committee vote of the S&D.  
Due to these sharp ideological divisions, the EP postponed the start of the 
negotiations with the Council, first seeking a stronger mandate from the 
plenary in order to disallow the Council to exploit its internal divisions. At 
the same time, the EP kept the door open for an agreement at first 
reading, choosing (as in the Six-Pack) not to vote on the legislative 
resolution. In the plenary vote in June, an overwhelming majority of 
deputies from the EPP, S&D, ALDE and G-EFA groups voted in favour. Yet, 
the EPP Group also made clear that “setting up a [redemption] fund 
quickly [was] implausible”.ix Clearly, the compromise between the groups 
was based on shaky grounds. 
After the plenary vote, the trilogues started and the pressure to quickly 
find an agreement began to mount. The EP amendments represented a 
significant departure from the Commission proposal, while the Council 
emphasized that its common position was the “starting position for the 
negotiations”.x Commissioner Rehn warned the MEPs, with the utmost 
clarity, that “as co-legislator, you have a choice: either to move forward in 
a timely way or to delay and create a legal grey area…no legal acrobatics 
would enable us to hide the fact that we had failed to live up to our 
political responsibilities”.xi The intergovernmental track was there to be 
exploited by the Council: “We are not in a vacuum that we can have our 
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institutional games here in Brussels. If we don’t deliver then the 
governments will deliver without us” (Interview G).  
By December 2012, 16 tripartite meetings with the co-legislators and the 
Commission had been held. As discussions unfolded, the agreement in 
the EP broke down, with the EPP siding with the Council and the 
Commission, the ALDE and S&D against. During the negotiations, the 
Commission was adamant in opposing the redemption fund on legal 
grounds and repeatedly stressed that the remit of the regulations was 
only budgetary coordination, rather than broader issues of economic 
coordination. Its position overlapped with that of the Council, for which 
the Redemption Fund was “a political non-starter” (Interview S and 
Interviews H and N). To prevent deadlock in the negotiations, the 
European Council also pressed for an early conclusion, inviting “the 
legislators to find an agreement with a view to adopting the ‘Two-pack’ 
by the end of 2012 at the latest.xii  
Eventually, the ALDE switched its position, accepting the Commission’s 
proposal to set up an expert group to assess the feasibility of a 
redemption fund, thus making a centre-right majority in the EP possible. 
In December 2012, the European Council urged its rapid adoption 
“following the decisive progress achieved”xiii, while Rehn reiterated the 
point that member states would push for an intergovernmental deal if 
discussions dragged for longer.xiv After 15 months, the agreement 
between the co-legislators was finally found in early 2013. 
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The output of the negotiations was a significant departure from the initial 
position of the EP: “They wanted to have the redemption fund, and then 
finally got a working group” (Interview V; Interviews H and P). The EP 
behaved “reasonably” and what was lost on the substance was partly 
compensated with “institutional rewards” such as the strengthening of 
the Economic Dialogue (Interviews N, H and I). Ultimately, it “recognized 
the political importance of this for the member states, and hasn’t made a 
war out of it either” (Interview S). 
 
Conclusions 
By analysing the Six-pack and the Two-pack, this article has first identified 
and then tracked the modalities through which the Heads shape a policy 
dossier under OLP. Without the political will of the Heads, the very ideas 
contained in the two legislative packages would not surface. The decision 
to strengthen the SGP came from the very top and should be considered 
when looking at the wider picture of the political responses to the Euro 
crisis. In the case of the Six-pack, the European Council even established a 
Task Force, which influenced and competed with the proposals of the 
Commission. 
The European Council was also actively involved during the policy 
process. This influenced both the speed of the policy process, as the 
Heads put pressures on the legislators to reach an agreement as quickly 
as possible, and the ways that the other institutions operate under the 
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OLP. The Commission constantly sided with the Council and also 
defended the latter’s position when this went against an increase of its 
own powers, as in the negotiations over RQMV. However, inferring from 
these instances that the Commission has become a de facto agent of the 
European Council would overstretch the argument. First, the interviewees 
mentioned other examples, even in the EMU, where the Commission was 
more on the side of the EP (Interview L). Second, the Commission has an 
institutional interest in getting the file out, especially in cases, such as the 
Six-pack and the Two-pack, which considerably increases its own powers 
with respect to the status quo (Interviews F, N and T). Third, the 
Commission proposals and the Council’s position were strikingly similar. 
As a Commission official said, “It’s not so much the issue of pleasing the 
Council ... The text that came out of the negotiations with the Council was 
pretty close to the original proposal put forward by the Commission” 
(Interview F). xv 
The relationship between the European Council and the Council is more 
subtle to read. Overall, they were on the same page, pushing legislation in 
the same direction. The Heads encroached in the legislative activities of 
the Council in a number of ways – dictating the agenda of its works, 
steering or patrolling the discussions in the Council and solving the 
impasses between institutions. However, there is not much evidence that 
the European Council systematically provides close directions at every 
stage of the legislative process. Overall, the Council and its bodies 
maintain the command of their legislative functions: the Heads were “not 
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really involved in the nitty-gritty of the negotiations. It was more ‘get it 
done quickly, as soon as possible’” (Interview I). In the EMU, the ministers 
of finance traditionally deplore the intervention of the European Council 
in their affairs and try everything they can to avoid it (Interview N). 
The EP saw its legislative position limited. If it played almost no part in the 
agenda-setting of the two packages, the impact it had during the policy-
process on their final outputs was minor. It took a back seat and operated 
in a 'responsible' way, de facto accepting that the legislation was 
predominantly cooked elsewhere. The Heads urged MEPs to approve the 
deals and respect the deadlines. Yet, this is a practice that they usually 
pursue in salient legislative dossiers and does not seem a peculiar feature 
of the Six-pack or the Two-pack. As to the threat of going 
intergovernmental, it is fair to say that it was never concrete, although it 
was in the mind of many participants. People in the EP felt that, if the 
parties did not reach an agreement, the (European) Council would secure 
stricter budgetary surveillance though intergovernmental means 
(Interviews P and S). 
If the analysis of the Six-pack and the Two-pack provides considerable 
evidence that the European Council was able to substantively shape the 
legislative process, even in the OLP, three caveats apply. First, the Six-
Pack and the Two-pack were negotiated in a moment of acute crisis, 
where the very existence of the Union was at stake. Whether the 
European Council will continue to shape, to such an extent, the policy 
process in a more ‘normal’ Union remains open to future assessment. 
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Indeed, serious threats to the survival of national political systems (e.g., 
wars or major economic crisis) similarly tend to empower the core 
executives, while ‘normal’ politics may resume when the crisis is over or 
becomes less existential (Owens and Pelizzo 2010, 1). Second, there is a 
significant exception to the intergovernmental story: the role of the ECB. 
The ECB offered valuable and influential advice in the elaboration of the 
policy content of the two packages. It had an important role in the Task 
Force and was regularly consulted throughout the various stages of the 
policy process (Interview S). Finally, if ideas matter in the EMU (e.g., 
McNamara 1999), the alliance between the European Council and the 
Commission in establishing stricter rules for fiscal and economic policies 
might not only be due to institutional developments (and the emergence 
of the European Council at the centre of the EU/EMU policy-making) but 
also, to shared economic beliefs among European elites. 
 
                                                          
i Schulz, Speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 30.01.2014. 
ii           While two of the dossiers were not formally under codecision, the six files were all negotiated together as a 
package (see Héritier et al. 2015, 64-66). 
iii Rehn, Debate in the EP, 22.06.2011. 
iv           The EP had asked for an extension of RQMV in 15 additional cases throughout the package. Several 
amendments were dismissed on legal grounds, while the Council agreed to one more situation of RQMV in 
order to strike a deal with the EP before the summer.  
v  See art. 6 of Regulation 1175/2011 (Wortmann-Kool’s report). 
vi Rehn, Debate in the EP, 22.06.2011. 
vii          For the details on the different decision-making rules used in the reformed SGP, see European Commission 
2012, 70-84. 
viii European Council, Conclusions, 09.12.2011. 
ix MEP Thyssen (on behalf of the EPP), debate in the EP plenary, 12.06.2012. 
x See debate in Council, 10.07.2012. 
xi           Rehn, ibidem. 
xii European Council, Conclusions, 19.10.2012. 
xiii European Council, Conclusions, 14.12.2012 
xiv Europolitics, “Rehn on Debt Mutualization”, 14.01.2014. 
xv         This is, obviously, not always the case. For instance, in the negotiations for a Financial Transaction Tax, the first 
proposal of the Commission was opposed by some members of the Council and had to be withdrawn. 
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Interview A – 25.03.15. Financial expert, Ministry of Economics and Finance, Rome. 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Interview B – 26.03.15. Financial expert, Ministry of Economics and Finance, Rome. 
Interview C – 09.04.15. Senior Assistant to (shadow) rapporteur (G/EFA Group). 
Interview D – 09.04.15. S&D Policy Advisor. 
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Interview F – 13.04.15. Director, European Commission. 
Interview G – 13.04.15. Head of Cabinet, European Commission. 
Interview H – 14.04.15. Senior administrator, economic policy, Council. 
Interview I – 14.04.15. Senior administrator, economic policy, Council. 
Interview J – 14.04.15. Financial Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Italy. 
Interview K – 14.04.15. Financial Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Portugal. 
Interview L – 15.04.15. Head of Unit and administrator, European Parliamentary Research Service. 
Interview M – 15.04.15. Administrator, ECON Committee, European Parliament. 
Interview N – 15.04.15. Financial Counsellor. Permanent Representation of the Netherlands. 
Interview O – 15.04.15. Administrator, ECON Committee, European Parliament. 
Interview P – 15.04.15. ALDE Policy Advisor. 
Interview Q – 16.04.15. Administrators (joint interview), ECON Committee, European Parliament 
Interview R – 16.04.15. Financial Counsellor. Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic. 
Interview S – 16.04.15. Senior administrators (joint interview). Legal Service, Council. 
Interview T – 16.04.15. Greens-EFA Policy Advisor. 
Interview U – 16.04.15. ECR Policy Advisor. 
Interview V – 30.05.15. Financial Counsellor. Permanent Representation of Cyprus. 
Interview W – 15.07.15. Administrators (joint interview). Legal services of the European Parliament. 
Interview X – 16.07.15. Senior MEP (EPP). ECON Committee. 
Interview Y – 16.07.15. Administrator, CRIS Committee, European Parliament. 
Interview Z – 16.07.15. Financial Counsellor. Permanent Representation of Ireland. 
Interview AA – 16.07.15. Assistant S&D.  
Interview AB – 17.07.15. MEP (S&D). ECON Committee. 
Interview AC – 17.07.15. Assistant to (shadow) rapporteur (ALDE Group). 
Interview AD – 17.09.15. Former President of the European Council. 
 
